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Rights of a Developmentally Disabled
Mother
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Christopher B., 1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court ex-
amined the termination of the parental rights of a cognitively im-
paired mother, Mary Ann R., over her two children, Christopher
and Kayla. In most instances, prior to terminating a parent's
rights under Rhode Island law, the state must attempt to reunite
the parent with his or her child by providing social services that
address the cause of the initial state intervention.
2 Such services
are commonly referred to as "reasonable efforts."
3 In this case, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court retreats from prior case law that re-
quired a higher (or at least different) bar for services provided to
cognitively disabled parents, 4 and the application of a true totality
of the circumstances analysis.5 For Mary Ann, the court's inconsis-
tent analysis resulted in the loss of her children without an ade-
quate opportunity to improve her parenting and rehabilitate
herself into a "fit" parent prior to the termination of her parental
rights.
Judicial termination of parental rights requires a three-step
analysis: first, the court must consider the weighty fundamental
interests that parents have in the "care and custody" of their chil-
l. 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003).
2. See id. at 306; R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7(a)(3) (2000).
3. See In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 306.
4. See In re William, 448 A.2d 1250, 1255 (R.I. 1982).
5. See In re Joseph S., 788 A.2d 475, 478 (R.I. 2002) (per curiam) ("[tlhe
issue of the reasonableness of the department's efforts must be determined
from the 'particular facts and circumstances of each case'" (quoting In re Kris-
ten B. 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989))).
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dren;6 second, the court must balance the parent's fundamental
rights with the state's interest in regulating the parent-child rela-
tionship; and third, the court must balance the interests of the
parent and the state in relation to the paramount "best interests
of the child" in having a permanent, nurturing environment in
which to develop. 7 Termination of parental rights cases are heart-
wrenching; in every case, at least one party - either the parents,
the state or the child - undoubtedly feels dissatisfied with the end
result. Further complicating an already difficult process are the
vague yet complex mandates of the "reasonable efforts" standards
set forth in federal8 and state statutes9 and refined by each state's
case law. Federal law bases state funding of foster care and other
child services for children in state custody on the achievement by
state officials of "reasonable efforts," by offering rehabilitative ser-
vices to parents within a strict timeline prior to terminating pa-
rental rights. States are pressured to meet the standards within
the statutory timeframe or risk jeopardizing their funding. 10
In general, however, the "reasonable efforts" standard is ill-
defined and inconsistently applied."1 As applied to developmen-
tally disabled parents like Mary Ann, the "reasonable efforts" of-
fered are often inadequate reunification services that fail in any
meaningful way to rehabilitate the parent's fitness.12 These efforts
would be improved if the state were to enact formal guidelines
that define with greater specificity what constitutes "reasonable
efforts." Such guidelines could provide the Rhode Island courts
with a better framework with which to measure the state's burden
6. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).7. See In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 880 (R.I. 1980) ("In all such situations
the approach should be three-dimensional, with due consideration given to
the interests of the parents, the children, and the state.").8. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-272, 94 Stat. 500; Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.(2000)).
9. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7 (2000).
10. See Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a) (2000).11. See generally Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demysti-fying the State's Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U.
PuB. INT. L.J. 259 (2003).
12. See Chris Watkins, Comment, Beyond Status: The Americans withDisabilities Act and the Parental Rights of People Labeled DevelopmentallyDisabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 1415, 1445- 47 (1995).
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in providing reunification services. These improved guidelines
could be especially helpful in cases involving developmentally dis-
abled parents like Mary Ann.
Mary Ann was thrice a victim: first, of the biology that limited
her cognitive abilities; second, of the violent men who abused her
and her children; and finally, of the state that failed to adequately
acknowledge these two other factors - both in the unsuccessful at-
tempt by the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF)
to provide her with "reasonable efforts" to reunify her with her
children, and in the failure of the Rhode Island Supreme Court to
incorporate these underlying factors into its totality of the circum-
stances analysis. Enacting formal guidelines that clearly delineate
the requirements of the "reasonable efforts" standard for Rhode
Island would better ensure that parents like Mary Ann receive
services that account for their developmental disabilities. This
way, the court can more effectively hold the state to the higher
burden that the "reasonable efforts" standard supposedly requires.
Part II of this case note provides the facts and procedural his-
tory of Mary Ann's case, while focusing on the court's analysis of
the "reasonable efforts" standard. Part III briefly traces the na-
tionwide application of the "reasonable efforts" guidelines as man-
dated by the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980 and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1996, as well as
the difficulty that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has encoun-
tered when attempting to reconcile Rhode Island statutory law
with these federal mandates. Part IV further illustrates how the
court's failure to abide by its own established precedent led to the
flawed legal reasoning underlying the holding in Christopher B.
Finally, Part V discusses how formal "reasonable efforts" guide-
lines would provide a solution for improving reunification services
to developmentally disabled parents by creating baseline factors
that could guide the court to a more consistent analysis of "rea-
sonable efforts." In addition, Part V further explains how formal
guidelines could incorporate relevant psychological and sociologi-
cal research on developmentally disabled parents and domestic
violence into a totality of the circumstances analysis. Accordingly,
legal guidelines that are more attentive to the special needs of de-
velopmentally disabled parents could provide parents like Mary
Ann with the resources necessary to rehabilitate their parental
fitness.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF IN RE CHRISTOPHER B.
A. Factual Background
Mary Ann's parenting first came under state scrutiny when
the state received a call to its hotline concerning Christopher and
Kayla, Mary Ann's two children. 13 On July 28, 1998, an investiga-
tor for the state found the children bruised and dirty, living in a
filthy and odiferous home.14 The children were removed from the
home and placed under seventy-two hour hold away from their
parents. 5 Soon after, the family court placed the children in tem-
porary custody of the DCYF, and on April 6, 1999, after Mary Ann
admitted to dependency as to both children, the state committed
the children to DCYF's care, custody and control.' 6
Within a few months, Mary Ann and her husband Dennis
were referred to a supervised visitation program run through the
Providence Children's Museum. Mary Ann was also subjected to
both psychological and parenting evaluations, conducted by a
Ph.D. psychologist, John Parsons, and a clinical social worker,
Pauline Santos, respectively.V In light of Mary Ann's mild mental
retardation, both practitioners recommended "specialized parent-
ing education" and a host of other services.' 8 While acknowledging
that even with such efforts Mary Ann might not successfully re-
unite with her children, both asserted that she ought be given the
chance to prove herself. 19
DCYF, however, neglected to offer Mary Ann specialized par-
enting education or any other form of specialized service that
would address her cognitive impairment.20 Ironically, the foster
parents with whom Christopher and Kayla were placed received
months of "intensive, specialized training sessions aimed at par-
enting special needs children."21 Mary Ann was offered (and re-
ceived) some marriage counseling to address her volatile
13. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301, 304 (R.I. 2003).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 305.
19. Id. at 304-05.
20. Id. at 305.
21. Id.
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relationship with Dennis. 22
On February 3, 2000, DCYF petitioned the family court to
terminate Mary Ann's parental rights,23 alleging three separate
statutory bases for termination:24 Mary Ann's mental deficiency;
25
her alleged substance abuse;26 and, under section 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) of
the Rhode Island General Laws, the "catch-all" provision of the
state's Termination of Parental Rights statute (TPR), a lack of any
other alternative.27 This catch-all provision allows termination
when children have been
placed in the legal custody or care of [DCYF] for at least
twelve (12) months; and the parents were offered or re-
ceived services to correct the situation which led to the
child being placed, and provided further that there is not
a substantial probability that the child will be able to re-
turn safely to the parents' care within a reasonable period
of time considering the child's age and the need for a
permanent home.28
After an eight day hearing, the family court terminated Mary
Ann's parental rights under the mental deficiency and the catch-
all provisions. 29 With respect to the finding under section 15-7-
7(a)(2)(i) (mental deficiency), the trial justice found that despite
DCYF's failure to offer Mary Ann services appropriate to her cog-
nitive disability, he was "compelled" to terminate her parental
rights.30 Citing the best interests of the children, he noted there
was little evidence that Mary Ann was capable of becoming a more
effective parent.31 As to the finding under section 15-7-7(a)(3) (the
catch-all provision), the trial justice found that the children were
in the custody of DCYF for twelve months, and that Mary Ann
was offered services (marriage counseling) to correct the situation
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The substance abuse allegation was dismissed by the family court
for lack of evidence. Id. at 306.
27. Id. at 305 n.5 & 306.
28. Id. at 305 n.5; R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7(a)(3) (2000).
29. Id. at 306.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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that led to their initial placement, but that there was no substan-
tial probability that the children could safely be returned home
within a reasonable time.32 Accordingly, Mary Ann's parental
rights were terminated.
B. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
1. Termination Under the "Mental Deficiency Provision"33
Mary Ann appealed the family court's termination decision to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. She asserted that DCYF had
failed to make the requisite "reasonable efforts" to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship as required by section 15-7-
7(a)(2)(i), the mental deficiency provision of the Rhode Island TPR
statute.34 Additionally, Mary Ann claimed that DCYF failed to
provide her with appropriate services to correct the issues which
led to the children's initial placement in state custody, as required
under the catch-all provision of the statute.35 Mary Ann did not
dispute the trial justice's factual findings in regards to her mild
mental retardation, placing her I.Q. at about sixty-six and her
reading ability at a third grade level.3 6 Nor did Mary Ann dispute
the trial justice's finding that she was "an extremely defensive and
32. Id. at 313.
33. § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i).
34. See In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 303. The portion of the statute
that the family court used as one basis for termination has since been
amended in 2000 by section 1 in chapter 69 of the Rhode Island Public Laws,
which now allows for termination if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is unfit by reason of "[i]nstitutionalization of the
parent, including imprisonment, for a duration to render it improbable for
the parent to care for the child for an extended period of time." 2000 R.I. Pub.
Laws 69 § 1. Prior to this amendment, section 15-7-7(a)(2)(i), as applied to
Mary Ann's termination proceeding, allowed for termination if the parent
was found unfit by reason of "[elmotional illness, mental illness, mental defi-
ciency, or institutionalization of the parent, including imprisonment, of such
a duration to render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an
extended period of time ...." In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 305.
35. See In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 303. In addition to Mary Ann's
two bases for appeal, DCYF joined a petition for a writ of certiorari "to review
the family court's initial order requiring visitation [by Mary Ann to her chil-
dren] to continue during the appeal." Id. at 307. As the focus of this article is
entirely on the "reasonable efforts" prong of Mary Ann's appeal, the visitation
issue will not be discussed herein.
36. See id. at 308.
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dependent individual.., lacking insight and exhibiting poor
judgment."37
In analyzing Mary Ann's case, the court acknowledged that
"reasonable efforts" are fact specific38 and must be "consistent with
a totality of the circumstances approach,"39 taking into account in-
tellectual limitations of the parent(s).4° In light of this approach,
the court discussed in detail the recommendations made by the
two psychological experts who examined Mary Ann: Dr. John Par-
sons and social worker Pauline Santos. 41 These recommendations
included counseling based on a "cognitive behavioral approach"
and "a comprehensive assortment of wraparound services," which
would include counseling, parenting classes, and an educational
advocate for the children. 42 Subsequently, DCYF made no new re-
ferrals to Mary Ann based on these recommendations, other than
for marriage counseling - a recommendation that the trial justice
found "incongruous" in light of the domestic violence between
Mary Ann and Dennis.43 Mary Ann did participate in the Families
Together program - a visitation program supervised by museum
staff - at the Providence Children's Museum; however, the trial
court found," and the Supreme Court agreed, that this program
was really not a "parenting" program per se, but essentially a su-
pervised visitation mechanism, that did not prove to be very help-
ful.45
The court agreed with Mary Ann that this complete failure by
the state to provide services that took into account her mental
disability did not in fact constitute "reasonable efforts," and sus-
tained Mary Ann's appeal on this count.46 Discussing the trial jus-
tice's conclusion that he was "compelled" to terminate Mary Ann's
rights because she was essentially incapable of improving her par-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting In re Joseph S., 788 A.2d 475, 478 (R.I. 2002) (per cu-
riam)).
40. Id.; see also In re William, 448 A.2d 1250, 1255 (R.I. 1982).
41. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 309.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 310.
44. In re Blais, Nos. 98-1715-1 & 98-1715- 2, at 14, 15 (R.I. Family Ct.,
2001).
45. See In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 308, 312.
46. Id. at 313.
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enting skills, the court stated: "[T]o hold that she would not bene-
fit from services never attempted would be to adopt a rule that
mentally impaired parents are per se incapable of parenting - a
holding that even the trial justice said he wished to avoid."47
The court thus decided that regardless of the likelihood of
success, prior to a finding of parental unfitness the state must
employ "reasonable efforts" before the analysis can shift to the
"best interests" of the children.48 The court stated that the "urgent
need of the children for permanency in their lives" 49 is an inappro-
priate focus, prior to a finding of parental unfitness. 50 The court
held that:
Because the trial justice found that Mary Ann's mental
deficiency was directly related to the situation that led to
the children's placement and because her mental health
interfered with her ability to parent Christopher and
Kayla effectively, we hold that DCYF, in petitioning for a
TPR decree on mental deficiency grounds, was required to
demonstrate that it undertook reasonable efforts to ad-
dress these mental-deficiency issues in the services that it
offered to this parent.51
In other words, under this section of the statute,"reasonable
efforts" are a condition precedent to termination. Because the ef-
forts made by the state were insufficient, the court would not up-
hold termination on this ground.
2. Termination Under Section 15-7-7(a)(3)
The court did uphold the termination on other grounds, how-
ever. Section 15-7-7(a)(3)52 is the catch-all provision of the Rhode
47. Id. at 312.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 310.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 313.
52. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(3) (2000). This section, entitled "Termina-
tion of parental rights," permits termination if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that:
The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the depart-
ment for children, youth and families for at least twelve (12) months;
and the parents were offered or received services to correct the situa-
tion which led to the child being placed; provided, that there is not a
substantial probability that the child will be able to return safely to
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Island TPR statute in that it allows for terminations for reasons
other than those specifically enumerated within the statute.5 3
Terminations under this provision arise from some combination of
circumstances that propel the child into state custody, and when it
seems unlikely those circumstances will change. This section al-
lows for termination of parental rights when a child has been in
state custody for a year, the state has provided the parent with
some services to rectify the original problem(s) that led to state
custody, and there is not a substantial likelihood that the child
can return home safely in the near future.54
As to this portion of the termination petition, Mary Ann did
not argue on appeal that she was not offered or did not receive any
services to correct the problems that led to the children's being
placed in state custody. Rather, she claimed that DCYF was re-
quired to show "reasonable efforts" in providing the services that
it did offer.5 5 DCYF countered by claiming that "under this sub-
section of the statute ... the agency was not required to make rea-
sonable efforts to strengthen and encourage the parental
relationship," but rather that any efforts to offer services (includ-
ing DCYF's minimal efforts) which "were - at least in some small
way - aimed at addressing Mary Ann's problems," must be consid-
ered reasonable. 56 The difference here is between efforts that,
when accrued, are enough to be seen as "reasonable," versus any
minute effort at all.
As to the question of whether any efforts, no matter how
minimal, suffice as "reasonable efforts," the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court held that, "§15-7-7(a)(3) [requires] a showing that the
services offered amount to reasonable efforts on the part of the
agency to correct the situation that led to the removal of the chil-
dren from the parental home."57 The court went on:
the parents' care within a reasonable period of time considering the
child's age and the need for a permanent home.
Id.
53. See e.g., § 15-7-7(a)(1) (willful neglect for one year or more); id. § 15-7-
7(a)(2)(ii) (cruel and abusive conduct); id. § 15-7-7(a)(v) (torture, chronic
abuse or sexual abuse); id. § 15-7-7(a)(2)(vi) (murder or felony assault of an-
other child).
54. See id. § 15-7-7(a)(3); supra note 52 and accompanying text.
55. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 313.
56. Id. at 314-15 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 315.
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After all, if such services are to have any chance of suc-
cess in correcting the situation that led to the removal of
the children from the family home, they must be 'reason-
able' in the sense of being capable of remedying the par-
ticular problem(s) that caused the children to be removed.
58
The court relied on prior case law to conclude that this portion
of the statute requires "reasonable efforts" by the state to provide
services "regardless of the unlikelihood for success" until the time
that the termination petition is filed.59 Accordingly, parents whose
cases might otherwise be dismissed as hopeless by DCYF and who
are offered little or no assistance by the state are protected. The
court exposed the fallacy in DCYF's reasoning as follows: "Indeed,
if we followed DCYF's argument to its logical conclusion, after
twelve months of placement, the department would be able to suc-
ceed on a TPR petition if it offered any form of services to the par-
ents, regardless of their [actual] utility to the parents ....
Moreover, Mary Ann's cognitive disability and her need for par-
enting assistance and education persuaded the court to find that:
the trial justice misconceived material evidence and
clearly was wrong in concluding that DCYF offered Mary
Ann reasonable services aimed at correcting this aspect of
the situation ... in light of the trial justice's findings that
Mary Ann's mental condition was directly related to
Christopher's and Kayla's placement. 61
Nevertheless, the court held that the trial justice's error as to
this particular basis under the catch-all provision 62 was harmless.
The court determined that DCYF sustained its burden under this
section as to "another" aspect of the circumstances leading to the
children's placement: "the mother's recurrent involvement with
abusive, dangerous men and her resultant inability to provide a
safe living environment for her children."63
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting In re Joseph S., 788 A.2d 475, 477-78 (R.I. 2002) (per cu-
riam)); see also In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002); In re William,
448 A.2d 1250, 1255 (R.I. 1982).
60. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 315.
61. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added).
62. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7(a)(3) (2000).
63. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 316.
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The court premised its conclusion in favor of termination un-
der the catch-all provision upon three specific grounds. First, the
court cited the abuse that Mary Ann's husband, Dennis, as well as
a subsequent boyfriend, perpetrated against her and the chil-
dren.6 4 Second, the court acknowledged the state's willingness to
provide marriage/couples therapy to Mary Ann so as to remedy
her propensity to enter into relationships with violent men.65 Fi-
nally, the court regarded her resistance to initiate divorce proceed-
ings against Dennis as conclusive evidence that Mary Ann was
unwilling to protect her children from her relationships with vio-
lent men.66 To bolster its conclusions, the court described in some
detail the testimony provided by Mary Ann's marriage counselor
as to the many incidents of abuse against Mary Ann, some of
which occurred while Mary Ann was pregnant.67 Regarding the ef-
fect of Mary Ann's cognitive disability on her inability to separate
from these abusive relationships, the court discussed the trial jus-
tice's finding that "the mother's intellectual limitations also cre-
ated concerns with respect to her ability to protect her children
from her abusive husband or other boyfriends."68 Additionally, the
court acknowledges that "Mary Ann's mental deficiencies... af-
fected her inability to navigate her relationships with these men
in such a way as to protect the children from abuse."69 Finally, the
court terminates Mary Ann's rights, "given Mary Ann's lack of co-
operation in ending these abusive relationships - despite DCYF's
reasonable efforts in this regard"70 and considering the best inter-
ests of Christopher and Kayla. In essence, the court blames the
victim.
III. REASONABLE EFFORTS IN TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES: A GENERAL BACKGROUND
The majority in In re Christopher B. based its holding on prior
Rhode Island Supreme Court interpretations of statutory re-
quirements for "reasonable efforts" in termination of parental
64. Id. at 314-15.
65. Id. at 314, 315 n.10.
66. Id. at 316-17.
67. Id. at 316.
68. Id. at 317.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 318.
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rights cases. In these prior cases, the court sought to reconcile
state statutory law with federal mandates that conditioned the re-
ceipt of funding for foster care and child welfare services upon a
willingness of the states to enact programs designed to prevent
children from being removed from their homes, and to increase the
likelihood that foster children would eventually be reunited with
their natural parents. In attempting to deconstruct the court's
analysis of Mary Ann's case, it is important to understand the
original intent of the federal "reasonable efforts" mandate and the
subsequent application of it to Rhode Island termination of paren-
tal rights cases.
Originally, federal funding for state child protective services
and foster care was allocated under Title IV of the Social Security
Act.7' This funding was expanded upon and modified in 1980 by
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Child
Welfare Act), 72 and again in 1997 by the Adoption and Safe Fami-
lies Act of 1997 (ASFA).73 Prior to 1980, the federal government
made payments to states for foster care, but did not offer similar
or adequate funding for preventative and family reunification ser-
vices; the focus was on protecting children from abusive and ne-
glectful parents, rather than on addressing parenting problems to
repair the child's biological family unit.74 The Child Welfare Act
enhanced funding for reunification services and family interven-
tion, but conditioned the funding on states' plans that provided for
reasonable efforts "(A) prior to placement of a child in foster care,
to prevent or eliminate the need for removal from a child from his
home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his
home."75 Unfortunately, the legislation offered little assistance to
the states in defining the contours of reasonable efforts and de-
termining when (and if) such efforts had been met. 76 The purpose
of this language, however, did seem clear: it was included to in-
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 - 679(b) (2000). Chapter 7 of Title IV is entitled
"Grants to States for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children and
for Child Welfare Services." See id. §§ 670-675.
72. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
73. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
74. See Crossley, supra note 11, at 270.
75. Id.
76. See id.
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crease the quality and amount of reunification services offered to
parents prior to foster care placement in an attempt to provide
permanency to children and reduce both the number of children in
foster care and the overall cost to society. 77
The "reasonable efforts" provisions under the Child Welfare
Act were further amended in 1997 by the ASFA. The ASFA ex-
tended "reasonable efforts" beyond reunification and family ser-
vices to include permanency planning for the child, with revised
timelines that "end[ed] the obligation to make reasonable efforts
much sooner."78 Critics have stated that rather than ensuring rea-
sonable efforts are made in every case prior to placement in foster
care and eventual termination, the "ASFA moves in the opposite
direction... [and] does not significantly shore up family support,
preservation, and reunification services."79 These changes could
have been a reaction to continued "foster care drift," in which chil-
dren languished for years in foster care with no permanent family
unit, or to isolated cases of extreme abuse and child death, which
pressed the entire system toward removal and more expedited
adoption of children.80
The federal "reasonable efforts" mandate has left the states,
for the most part, on their own to interpret what "reasonable ef-
forts" entail. David Herring, a critic of the "reasonable efforts"
mandate, has stated that the "reasonable efforts" requirement
punishes the child by creating an irrelevant "condition precedent
to TPR."81 Other critics, including Will Crossley, conversely be-
lieve that "reasonable efforts" provisions punish the parent by
adding "boilerplate services" to social work case plans (i.e., parent-
ing classes) which are "unrelated to the conditions that gave rise
to intervention, and then penal[ize] parents who fail to fulfill
these ancillary requirements."8 2 Another critic, Hilary Baldwin,
77. See id. at 272.
78. Id. at 281-82.
79. Id. at 282.
80. See id. at 270-77.
81. David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in
Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures
of the State Child Wclfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 139, 142 (1992). Herring
discusses his belief that inclusion of a "reasonable efforts" requirement "in-
creases the risk that children will not be provided with permanent homes in
time to meet their developmental needs." Id. at 142.
82. Crossley, supra note 11, at 305.
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has noted that the ASFA shifts the focus in spending to post-
termination placements, not pre-termination services to parents,
and that "an equal emphasis should be placed on the services pro-
vided to natural parents before the termination proceedings" 3 be-
cause "the money we spend on foster families might be better
spent on the biological family."84
Discerning the line between "reasonable" and "less than rea-
sonable" efforts is no simple task. Nevertheless, prior to In re
Christopher B., the Rhode Island Supreme Court in a number of
cases set out to set parameters for analyzing this "reasonable ef-
forts" federal mandate. The court held that "the department is re-
quired, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(3), to make reasonable efforts to
strengthen the parental relationship, until a termination petition
is filed pursuant to § 15-7-7(b)(2)."85 DCYF is required to make
such efforts, "regardless of the unlikelihood for success."8 6 It is
only after there has been a finding of "reasonable efforts" that it is
permissible to examine the fitness of the parent'and ultimately
weigh the best interests of the child.87 Such language creates a
"reasonable efforts" condition precedent (or a "necessary precondi-
tion"88 ) before shifting the focus to an examination of parental fit-
ness. In other words, if the state has not made "reasonable efforts"
to provide services that will rehabilitate the parent or rectify the
circumstances that put the child in state custody initially, the
court cannot find the parent unfit.8 9
The court has also employed a totality of the circumstances
approach in analyzing the reasonableness of the efforts made by
83. Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study
and Proposed Solutions, 28 J. LEGIS. 239, 292 (2002).
84. Id. at 294. In In re Christopher B., both the trial justice and the su-
preme court note the disparity between the "minimalist" services offered to
Mary Ann R. as Christopher and Kayla's biological parent, and the extensive
and intense services provided to the children's foster parents. In re Christo-
pher B., 823 A.2d at 305.
85. In re Joseph S., 788 A.2d 475, 477-78 (R.I. 2002) (per curiam).
86. Id. at 477-78.
87. See In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612, 615 (R.I. 1997); see also In re Kris-
ten B., 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989); In re Lafreniere, 420 A.2d 82, 84 (R.I.
1980).
88. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 308.
89. This, of course, does not apply to the sections of the statute under
which reasonable efforts themselves are not necessary prior to termination,
which includes those discussed previously, supra note 52, such as torture,
murder of another child, etc.
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the state90 that takes into account the "particular facts and cir-
cumstances of each case,"9 1 as well as the intellectual limitations
of the parent(s) being petitioned.92 In a case decided after In re
Christopher B., the Rhode Island Supreme Court again confirmed
that "when a parent is cognitively impaired.., reasonable ser-
vices should address such an impairment."93 Nonetheless, the
court has held that there is a limit to what the state must do to
meet the "reasonable efforts" requirement to reunite children with
their parents: "DCYF does not guarantee and ought not be bur-
dened 'with the additional responsibility of holding the hand of a
recalcitrant parent."' 94 However, there is also a baseline below
which "reasonable efforts" may not fall: "Generally, it requires
that the agency show that 'reunification of the family was at-
tempted in good faith,'" 95 even in a post-ASFA world with the
ASFA's abbreviated timelines for permanency. In sum, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has held, under a totality of the circum-
90. See In re William, 448 A.2d 1250, 1256 (R.I. 1982). In that case, the
court further stated that "[tihe requirement that the child welfare agency
seeking termination exert 'reasonable efforts' to nurture the parental rela-
tionship has been said to express a societal judgment that the state should
not take such a drastic step as termination without first attempting to re-
build the parent-child bond." Id. (citing H. Gordon, Terminal Placements of
Children and Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The New York
Permanent Neglect Statute, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 215, 237 (1971)). In In re
William, the court also noted that the relevant statute, § 15-7-7, provides no
guidelines as to what constitutes "reasonable efforts," but referenced the
comparative New York statute, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(b) (McKinney
1981), which describes the New York equivalent "diligent efforts" as requir-
ing, in pertinent part:
(1) consultation and cooperation with the parents in developing a plan for ap-
propriate services to the child and his family; (2) making suitable arrange-
ments for the parents to visit the child; (3) provision of services and other
assistance to the parents so that problems preventing the discharge of the
child from care may be resolved or ameliorated; and (4) informing the parents
at appropriate intervals of the child's progress, development, and health.
Id. at 1257 n.3.
91. See In re Joseph S., 788 A.2d 475, 478 (R.I. 2002) (per curiam) (quot-
ing In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989), citing In re Ann Marie,
461 A.2d 394, 395 (R.I. 1983)).
92. See In re William, 448 A.2d at 1254.
93. In re William R., 839 A.2d 529, 532 (R.I. 2004).
94. In re Joseph S., 788 A.2d at 478 (quoting In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d at
204).
95. In re Jarvis R., 766 A.2d 395, 398 (R.I. 2001) (quoting In re Dennis P.,
749 A.2d 582, 586 (R.I. 2000)).
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stances analysis, that "reasonable efforts" made by the state to re-
unite parents with their children held in state custody must be
made in good faith, tailored to the facts and circumstances of each
case, taking into consideration intellectual or cognitive limitations
of the parents.
IV. REASONABLE EFFORTS IN IN RE CHRISTOPHER B.
The court's opinion in In re Christopher B. is both internally
inconsistent and incompatible with a totality of the circumstances
precedent. In its opinion, the court fails to account for the need to
consider the effects of the interaction of developmental disability
and domestic violence in determining what constitutes "reason-
able efforts" for this particular parent. In attacking the "reason-
able efforts" made by a state to assist a parent, the parent is not
necessarily claiming that no services were provided at all, but
rather that those provided gave the parent little or no opportunity
to rehabilitate her parental fitness. Tactically, an attack on the
services provided by the state is a means of attempting to unravel
the state's termination of a parent's rights without having to ad-
dress the issue of parental unfitness because "a finding of "rea-
sonable efforts" by DCYF is a necessary precondition for a finding
of parental unfitness, and a prerequisite to the granting of a TPR
petition."96
In its analysis of the "reasonable efforts" made by the state to
assist Mary Ann in reuniting with her children and correcting the
situation that led to their placement in state custody, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court did not examine or emphasize all of the fac-
tors it should have in determining the true "totality of the circum-
stances." On the one hand, the court found that the state's efforts
to address Mary Ann's parenting, as affected by her cognitive dis-
ability, fell far short of the minimum threshold of reasonableness.
The court echoed the trial justice's conclusion that, "[tihe tragedy
... is that [Mary Ann] was never even offered services that would
be the most appropriate for her cognitive level of functioning. Un-
fortunately, the system has failed Maryann [sic] RU."97
96. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301, 308 (R.I. 2003) (citing R.I. GEN
LAws § 15-7-7(b)(1) (2000)); see also In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I.
2002); In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d at 203.
97. In re Blais, Nos. 98-1715-1 & 98-1715- 2, at 13 (R.I. Family Ct. 2001).
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The court then isolated for examination the domestic violence
that Dennis perpetrated against Mary Ann, and asserted that the
services provided to address this issue were reasonable. 98 As such,
because of her perceived unwillingness to terminate her relation-
ship with her abusive husband, the court found Mary Ann unfit,
and therefore that termination would be in the best interests of
the children. The court found her to have been an unfit parent,
even though the trial justice made no findings of fact as to
whether Mary Ann was offered or received services appropriate to
address her repeated problems with abusive male relationships. 99
This isolation of the domestic violence issue, and the subsequent
finding of "reasonable efforts" made to address this problem, does
not accord with a totality of the circumstances approach in deter-
mining "reasonable efforts." As such, the court failed to acknowl-
edge Mary Ann's cognitive disability and its effect on her ability to
extract herself from her situation with Dennis.
Prior to its final termination holding, the court stated that in
order to reunite with her children, Mary Ann needed to address
two discrete - albeit related - problems that led to her
children's initial placement: first, her need for basic par-
enting education in light of her limited cognitive abilities;
and second, her need to address her abusive relationships
with Dennis and the other men in her life, which were af-
fecting adversely her ability to raise Christopher and
Kayla in a safe environment 00
The fallacy in the court's reasoning is rooted in its attempt to
separate the issue of Mary Ann's disability and parenting from the
matter of domestic violence in her household. In fact, the court ac-
knowledged that the three elements are unalterably intertwined
in that the domestic violence affected Mary Ann's parenting,
which was in turn affected by her cognitive disability. Ironically,
the court even cites as support for its conclusions the trial justice's
statement:
"Clearly the situation which led to the children being
placed with respect to Mary Ann is directly related to her
98. See In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 316-18.
99. See id. at 314.
100. Id.
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mental retardation .... Her intellectual limitations...
create concerns with respect to her ability to protect her
children from her abusive husband or other boy-
friends."O1
Thus, although the court made a factual finding that nothing was
done to adequately address Mary Ann's parenting or cognitive
disability, the court nonetheless found that "reasonable efforts"
were made to address this domestic abuse. Yet, the court ulti-
mately lost sight of the causal link between Mary Ann's cognitive
disability and her propensity for entering into abusive relation-
ships. This isolation of a single factor (domestic violence), while
not accounting for other strongly relevant factors (Mary Ann's dis-
ability) that the court itself acknowledges, does not comport with a
totality of the circumstances approach.
Moreover, the court failed to recognize the Hobson's choice
that DCYF presented Mary Ann as it pertained to her relationship
with Dennis. Here, the court cites DCYF's referral of Mary Ann
and Dennis to marriage counseling as the linchpin service in-
tended to correct the domestic violence situation, and uses this as
the basis for a finding of "reasonable efforts." However, there is no
mention in either the trial justice's or the supreme court's opinions
of other services provided to Mary Ann to "correct" this domestic
violence situation.O2 Rather, on the one hand, the court faults
Mary Ann for missing counseling sessions with her marriage
counselor (counseling that would presumably aid her in maintain-
ing her marriage), 1o3 but on the other hand faults her for not ex-
101. Id.
102. The court noted that the trial justice found the referral to couples
therapy "incongruous under the circumstances." Id. at 310. These circum-
stances were that Mary Ann was being violently abused by Dennis. There is
no mention in either the trial or supreme court opinions of other services of-
fered that might have been more appropriate than couples therapy, such as
referrals to domestic violence resource agencies, shelters, battered women's
groups, or anything else of that nature. However, the court did state in an-
other section of the opinion that efforts to provide services must be "reason-
able in the sense of being capable of remedying the particular problem(s) that
caused the children to be removed," id. at 315, yet the state appears to have
offered Mary Ann little to assist her and her children in removing themselves
to a safer environment.
103. "Indeed, the only counseling Mary Ann needed about her 'couplehood'
with Dennis was to dump the profane, violent, child-abusing bum." Brief for
Appellant at 10, In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003) (No. 2001-150-
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tricating herself from the domestic violence in this same relation-
ship. It seems that the court is simultaneously suggesting that
Mary Ann ought to try harder to stay and repair the marriage and
at the same time leave to protect her children, a suggestion that is
contradictory at best. In fact, the trial record indicated that Mary
Ann had acquired some insight into the necessity of ending her re-
lationship with her husband. Indeed, the appellate brief presented
by Mary Ann's counsel emphasized that "more often than not,
Mary Ann (who recognized that Dennis was an impediment to her
reunification with the children) focused [in these sessions] on
whether she should stay with Dennis. Eventually, in fact, Mary
Ann did leave Dennis."10 4 The court made much of the fact that
Mary Ann's marriage counselor "repeatedly offered to assist Mary
Ann in filling out the necessary paperwork to procure a divorce,"
and that "Mary Ann resisted initiating divorce proceedings
against Dennis."10 5 However, the court criticized the efforts that
Mary Ann did make to protect herself and her children from Den-
nis's violence, such as "call[ing] the police on numerous occasions
to escape domestic violence initiated by Dennis,"10 6 recognizing
that Dennis was a "roadblock" to reunification with her children,
asking to initiate divorce proceedings against Dennis, and ulti-
mately leaving him. 07 The court even construed the fact that
when Dennis got out of prison he assaulted her "by grabbing her
and by attempting to throw her out of the house while she was
pregnant" 08 as evidence against Mary Ann. 0 9
The court's attempt to avoid the true totality of the circum-
stances is further encapsulated in a confounding statement by
which the court sought to minimize the significant impact that
Mary Ann's cognitive disability had upon her ability to protect
herself and her children from abusive relationships: "Neverthe-
less, protecting her children from the unsafe conditions created by
these abusive relationships was one thing, but correcting her en-
M.P.).
104. Id. at 6 (citing the trial record at page 10); In re Blais, Nos. 98-1715-1
& 98-1715-2, at 15 (R.I. Family Ct. 2001).
105. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 316.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 316-17.
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try into and her failure to end such relationships was quite an-
other."110 A totality of the circumstances determination of "reason-
able efforts," however, would examine the entry into and
continuation of a relationship embroiled with domestic violence
together. Moreover, the court contradicts itself when it states that
"protecting her children.., was one thing," separate and apart
from Mary Ann's "failure to end such relationships," because its
own determination of Mary Ann's failure to protect her children is
grounded in the fact that the relationship did continue."' Protect-
ing the children from any abusive situation should be of para-
mount concern to all parties involved; however, from a legal
standpoint, the "best interests of the child" prong of the analysis is
not reached until there has been an initial finding of "reasonable
efforts," as determined by examining the totality of the circum-
stances, followed by a finding of parental unfitness. 1 2 This is the
precedent that the court has created; if such a series of hoops is
not adequately protecting children, perhaps it should expressly
overrule that precedent rather than try to force Mary Ann's case
to fit into the existing framework by giving short shrift to the
causal link between her cognitive disability and her perceived un-
fitness.
The court's internal conflict with the three step process is
most evident in a footnote of its opinion, in which the court distin-
guishes Mary Ann's case from a case that DCYF relied upon, In re
Michael B." 3 DCYF cited to Michael B. to support its proposition
that "mentally impaired parents [can be found to be] per se inca-
pable of parenting.""4 Seeking to avoid such a holding, as the trial
justice had wished to do, the court distinguished Mary Ann's case
from Michael B.
In Michael B., the court stated that "[w]e are constrained to
concur with the trial justice's assessment that no amount of effort
on the part of DCYF was likely to enable these parents 'to change
110. Id. at 317.
111. See id. The court stated that "Mary Ann failed to take the required
steps to end these relationships or to restructure them in such a way so as to
ensure domestic safety for herself and her children." Id.
112. See id. at 312. The court itself states that "absent a finding of reason-
able efforts, the balance of inquiry does not yet shift to the 'best interests of
the child.'" Id. (citing In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612, 615 (R.I. 1997)).
113. 796 A.2d 467 (R.I. 2002).
114. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 312 n.9.
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[their] conduct and to improve the conditions that caused [Mi-
chael] to enter DCYF care initially." 115 However, the court noted
that the parents in Michael B. were uncooperative with DCYF and
refused to comply with their case plans, whereas Mary Ann "coop-
erated with DCYF in attending programs when her caseworker in-
formed her about them.116 For example, [the caseworker] testified
that Mary Ann would regularly arrive as much as two hours early
for supervised-visitation ... ,"117 The court also concluded that in
Michael B., "although the parents exhibited some mental-health
problems, the primary factor that led to the child's placement...
was domestic violence." 18
As such, DCYF's reliance upon Michael B. was misplaced be-
cause in that case domestic violence was the primary basis for
termination, whereas mental illness was merely a collateral issue.
Therefore, DCYF's argument that mental incapacity could be a per
se basis for a finding of parental unfitness was wholly without
merit. Furthermore, because Mary Ann's cognitive disability was
the primary basis for the removal of her children, the facts in Mi-
chael B. were not dispositive. Despite its attempt to distinguish
the holding in Michael B. from Mary Ann's case, the court inexpli-
cably based its final termination on domestic violence, without
considering Mary Ann's "mental health problems" (the reason for
initial placement) as part of its totality of the circumstances
analysis. Thus, the court undermined its own basis for terminat-
ing Mary Ann's parental rights. In Michael B., uncooperative par-
ents with "mental health issues" have their parental rights
terminated based on "the primary factor that led to the child's
placement.., domestic violence." 1 9 The court distinguished Mary
Ann's case, noting that Mary Ann is "cooperative" and her chil-
115. In re Michael B., 796 A.2d at 469 (quoting In re John W., 682 A.2d
930, 932 (R.I. 1996)).
116. The statement there, "when her caseworker informed her about
them," refers to the fact that the social worker in Mary Ann's case made a re-
ferral to the Blackstone Valley Community Action Program for parenting
education classes, but could not remember if she ever told Mary Ann about
the referral. See In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 308. Mary Ann denied ever
being told of this referral. Trial Record at 6, In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d
301 (R.I. 2003) (No. 2001-150-M.P.).
117. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 312, n.9.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing In re Michael B., 796 A.2d 467, 469 (R.I. 2002)).
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dren are primarily placed due to problems arising from her cogni-
tive disabilities, not domestic violence. However, the court then
terminates due to the lack of cooperation Mary Ann displays in
addressing domestic violence.
The court's opinion in Christopher B. is both internally incon-
sistent and incompatible with past precedent that has established
a totality of the circumstances approach to the "reasonable efforts"
analysis. The court seemingly floundered as it sought to find a
way to terminate this parent's rights and ensure permanency for
her children. This is because the measurement of what establishes
"reasonable efforts" is so case specific due to the fact that the
Rhode Island TPR statute lacks overarching guidelines. The court
fails to account for the effects of Mary Ann's developmental dis-
ability in determining what constitutes "reasonable efforts" for
this parent. The inadequacy of the services provided to Mary Ann
and the court's failure to acknowledge this deficiency and hold the
state to its "reasonable efforts" burden call for adjustments to the
requirements the state must meet in providing services to devel-
opmentally disabled parents.
V. "REASONABLE EFFORTS" GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY
DISABLED PARENTS: THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN MARY ANN'S CASE AS
AN EXAMPLE
A. Reasonable Efforts with the Developmentally Disabled Parent
The foregoing analysis of Mary Ann's case begs the question:
What should the court require of the state for a finding of "reason-
able efforts" for parents who are developmentally disabled? Cer-
tainly the issues are complex, and the need for children who have
been placed in state custody to find permanence often overshad-
ows the needs of their biological parents to rehabilitate them-
selves into fit parents. "Reasonable efforts" is a difficult concept to
define 120 and put into effect for prototypical parents (if there is
such a thing in TPR cases, which are frequently complex in gen-
eral), much less with developmentally disabled parents. How far
must the state go to assist these parents in becoming fit?121 The
120. See discussion infra Part III.
121. In Mary Ann's case, the trial justice in his opinion specified that he
'did not mean to suggest that this case falls within the purview of the Ameri-
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Rhode Island Supreme Court has clearly stated that the "particu-
lar needs" of cognitively impaired parents must be considered, 122
and that "efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental rela-
tionship with respect to an average parent are not necessarily rea-
sonable to an intellectually limited one."123 But concretely, what
does this mean?
The appellate courts in sister states have held that there
must be limitations on what the court can require of the state to
fulfill the "reasonable efforts" mandate with developmentally dis-
abled parents. In a parallel situation to that of Mary Ann's case,
the Massachusetts Court of Appeals stated that "the requirement
includes accommodating the special needs of biological parents
who are handicapped or disabled. Nevertheless, heroic or extraor-
dinary measures, however desirable they may at least abstractly
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), [however], it is perhaps instructive to been
(sic) in mind that Federal statute's stated purpose is 'to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities to assure equality of opportunity and full
participation ... in the benefits of the services, programs and activities of a
public entity." In re Blais, Nos. 98-1715-1 & 98-1715- 2, at 9 (R.I. Family Ct.,
2001). Courts have been in conflict as to whether the ADA can be utilized as a
defense to a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition, but the trend thus
far has been that the ADA cannot be used as a defense at the TPR stage;
rather, if it is to be raised at all, it must be done prior to the filing of the TPR
petition when services are initially offered. See, e.g., In re Terry, 610 N.W. 2d
563, 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893, 898-99 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1999); In re B.K.F., 704 So. 2d 314, 317-18 (La. Ct. App. 1997); In re
B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 720 (Vt. 1997); see generally Sherry S. Zimmerman, Par-
ents' Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency as Ground for Termination of Paren-
tal Rights-Applicability of Americans with Disabilities Act, 119 A.L.R. 5th
351. One of the most cited cases in this area of law, In re Terry, 610 N.W. 2d
563, stated that "termination of parental rights proceedings do not constitute
'services, programs, or activities' within the meaning of [the ADA] 42 U.S.C. §
12132." Id. at 570. For further discussion on the applicability of the ADA to
developmentally disabled parents facing termination of their parental rights,
see generally Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities
Act to the Termination of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Dis-
abilities, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 387 (2000); Duffy Dillion, Com-
ment, Child Custody and the Developmentally Disabled Parent, 2000 WIS. L.
REV. 127 (2000); Watkins, supra note 12; Teri L. Mosier, Note, "Trying to
Cure a Seven-Year Itch" The ADA Defense in Termination of Parental Rights
Actions, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 785 (1998-99); Dave Shade, Empowerment for the
Pursuit of Happiness: Parents with Disabilities and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 16 LAw & INEQ. 153 (1998).
122. In re William, 448 A.2d 1250, 1256 (R.I. 1982).
123. Id. at 1255.
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be, are not required." 124 The Connecticut Appellate Court echoed
this sentiment when it stated that "reasonable efforts means do-
ing everything reasonable, not everything possible;"125 however,
"such efforts should not make it impossible to attain reunification
in a given case."126 The Connecticut court also acknowledged that
the inherent imbalance of power between the individual defending
against a petition to terminate parental rights and the state cre-
ates a situation in which the state's obligation to provide "reason-
able efforts" becomes more weighty:
"[Tihe parent is by definition saddled with problems: eco-
nomic, physical, sociological, psychiatric or any combina-
tion thereof. The agency, in contrast, is vested with
expertise, experience, capital, manpower and prestige.
Agency efforts correlative to their superiority [are] obliga-
tory."127
In general, all parents are presumed "fit" until the state
proves otherwise. However, "the presumption that children's best
interests are in remaining with their natural parents who wish to
raise them' is frequently reversed in reality for developmentally
disabled parents. Instead, 'they must prove their competence in
the face of myriad presumptions of inadequacy.'"' 28 In Mary Ann's
case, although two different professional assessments of her cogni-
tive disabilities and their effect on her parenting suggested that
she needed a variety of specialized services to assist her, the state
did virtually nothing to assist her in her parenting. Rather than
offering her specialized services tailored to her developmental dis-
abilities, the state merely offered the minimum level of services it
124. In re Adoption of Lenore, 770 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)
(citations omitted).
125. In re Eden F., 710 A.2d 771, 783 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998). In light of
this statement, it is interesting to note that the State of Rhode Island argua-
bly did just that in Mary Ann's case by providing the foster family her son
was placed with "six months of intensive training, one-on-one, with the
agency director, one or two times per week, two to four hours each time," both
before and after his placement "while virtually nothing was done to assist
Mary Ann in her reunification with Kayla and Christopher." Brief for Appel-
lant, supra note 103, at 7, 10.
126. In re Eden F., 710 A.2d at 783.
127. Id. (quoting In re Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368, 474 (N.Y. 1984)).
128. Dillion, supra note 121, at 143 (quoting Watkins, supra note 12, at
1448).
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might offer to a cognitively able parent. Critics have noted this
trend:
More common than the complete failure to offer reunifica-
tion services, however, is. the failure to offer adequate or
reasonably modified services to parents with mental dis-
abilities. In many cases, reunification services are offered
pro forma with the one size fits all concept. Under these
circumstances, failure is projected and expected, not from
the parents with the mental disability, but from the
judges, social workers and service providers. Despite
their efforts, parents are usually found unable to im-
prove. 129
If these parents are to have any realistic hope of family pres-
ervation and potential reunification with their children, they need
to have specialized services provided to them. As the Connecticut
Appellate Court in In re Eden F. instructed, the power to provide
rehabilitative services in these circumstances is retained by the
state, not by the parents; as such, the state has the primary re-
sponsibility to determine which specific services would likely have
some beneficial effect for a developmentally disabled parent in
light of her particular needs. 130 It is not that Mary Ann (and oth-
ers like her) is reasonably likely to become a fit parent; rather, it
is that she ought to be provided the opportunity to achieve fitness,
and that her children should be provided the opportunity to re-
main with their biological mother. The state cannot be held liable
for failing to perform miracles, but the state can be expected to
make the minimum "reasonable effort" that might afford some
chance of change for these parents.
One possible approach for ensuring that the state more con-
sistently provides all parents with a higher minimum standard of
service would be to enact statutory guidelines that the court could
then use as a framework in its analysis of whether the state has
met its "reasonable efforts" for these parents. Indeed, the Federal
Children's Bureau, a division of the Department of Health and
Human Services, has issued Guidelines for Public Policy and State
Legislation Governing Permanence for Children (Guidelines).131
129. Kerr, supra note 121, at 415.
130. See In re Eden F., 710 A.2d at 783.
131. See Crossley, supra note 11, at 313.
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These Guidelines purport to provide some insight into the "rea-
sonable efforts" analysis, and suggest that states implement laws
requiring courts to consider a variety of factors in making "rea-
sonable efforts" determinations. These factors include:
1. the dangers to the child and the family problems that
precipitate those dangers;
2. whether the services the agency provided relate specifi-
cally to the family's problems and needs;
3. whether case managers diligently arranged services for
the family;
4. whether the appropriate services for the family were
available and timely; and
5. the results of the services provided. 132
These types of Guidelines would force the state to better ac-
count for factors such as a developmental disability, and would
also allow the courts to hold the state accountable when it fails to
provide specialized services to parents who such disabilities. Pres-
ently, the court's current totality of the circumstances approach
for assessing reasonable efforts does not hold the state to a high
enough burden in providing services to these parents, as evi-
denced by Mary Ann's case. Rhode Island could enact legislation
that requires a more specific judicial determination of reasonable
efforts. Such legislation could propel DCYF into offering better
services to parents whose children are in state custody, and per-
haps broaden the array of services available to parents who are
cognitively disabled.
Minnesota is one state that has more specific statutory lan-
guage "that makes clear that the state agency bears the burden of
establishing that it has made reasonable efforts and provides a
relatively detailed list of factors courts must consider"133 in ana-
lyzing whether the state has met its burden. These factors include
whether the services provided by the state are: "1) relevant to the
safety and protection of the child; 2) adequate to meet the needs of
the child and family; 3) culturally appropriate; 4) available and
132. Id.
133. Id. at 303.
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accessible; 5) consistent and timely; [and] 6) realistic under the
circumstances." 134 Such factors could include requirements that
parents suffering from a developmental disability have services
provided that address their disability in all realms, not just par-
enting. In Mary Ann's case, a more comprehensive approach to her
developmental disability might have meant that the services pro-
vided to address her domestic violence issues would account for
her cognitive limitations; this could have taken the form of a "life-
line," as research suggests that developmentally disabled victims
of domestic violence require even more specialized services than
other victims. 135
B. The Domestic Violence in Mary Ann's Case
Mary Ann's case is complicated not only by the fact that she is
developmentally disabled, but because she is a repeat victim of
domestic violence. 136 Rather than acknowledging the extreme dif-
ficulty of any person separating from a physically abusive rela-
tionship, the court faulted Mary Ann for her failed attempts to
protect her children and herself from further abuse. 137 Critics
claim that this is not uncommon: "Mothers who are victims of do-
mestic violence too often become the subjects of 'double abuse,'...
first by a partner and then by the state 'through forced unneces-
sary separation of the mothers from their children on the excuse
that this sundering is necessary to protect the children."' 138 Addi-
134. Id.
135. See generally Heidi Strickler, Interaction Between Family Violence
and Mental Retardation, 39 MENTAL RETARDATION 461 (2001); Bonnie E. Carl-
son, Mental Retardation and Domestic Violence: An Ecological Approach to
Intervention, 42 SOCIAL WORK 79 (1997).
136. In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301, 316-17 (R.I. 2003). It should be
noted that Mary Ann's husband Dennis also alleged an incident of domestic
violence by her, and the Family Court ordered her to attend domestic-
violence counseling based on this one occurrence. Id. at 316.
137. See id. at 316-18. The court recounted how Mary Ann did participate
in some counseling, did call the police after Dennis's attacks on numerous oc-
casions, did recognize Dennis as a "roadblock" to reunification with her chil-
dren, and did voice a desire to leave him and to initiate divorce proceedings.
Id. at 316. Rather than acknowledging these attempts as evidence of an effort
to separate, the court viewed them as evidence of an inability to separate -
an incongruous finding, given Mary Ann's eventual permanent separation
from Dennis. Id. at 316-18.
138. Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, "Bad"
Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11
20051 789
790 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.O:763
tionally, these mothers face many obstacles that other parents
under scrutiny by the state in abuse, neglect, and termination
proceedings do not, such as "increased physical danger to the
woman and her children in the period immediately following her
departure, the lack of domestic violence shelters, an inability to
find permanent housing, and a lack of employment." 139
In cases like Mary Ann's, the timelines imposed by the ASFA
for "reasbnable efforts" to occur prior to deciding permanence for
the child put more pressure.on the parent to rehabilitate at an ex-
traordinary speed. As Catherine Ross notes, in those cases "involv-
ing mothers who may or may not be neglectful, or who are victims
in their own right, ASFA's categorical treatment of mothers and
children may not serve all children equally well. Unfortunately,
the marginal cases are not rare." 140
In addition, lurking in the background of many, if not most,
TPR cases is the fact that the parents are struggling with extreme
poverty. One critic, discussing continuous complaints about the
lack of funding for preventative and reunification services, con-
cludes that "although in theory children are not removed from
their parents because of poverty.. . this distinction cannot be
maintained."141 Separating from a domestically violent partner
while struggling with poverty and child rearing would be insur-
mountable for many women. For a woman like Mary Ann, who is
also developmentally disabled, such a situation would seem per-
haps hopeless, particularly given the timelines imposed for reha-
bilitation.142
While the court referred repeatedly to Mary Ann's difficulty
leaving Dennis and protecting herself and her children from him,
it failed to acknowledge in its totality of the circumstances analy-
sis that research shows this difficulty to be very typical of victims
of domestic violence. This is because domestic violence "almost al-
ways escalates when the batterer discovers that the victim is
about to or actually has left him.... Accordingly, a victim's fear of
VA. J. Soc. POLY & L. 176, 218-19 (2004) (quoting Nicholson v. Williams, 203
F. Supp. 2d 153, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).
139. Id. at 220.
140. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 190 (quoting Sarah H. Ramsey, Children in Poverty: Reconcil-
ing Children's Interests with Child Protective Services and Welfare Policies: A
Response to Ward Doren and Dorothy Roberts, 61 MD. L. REv. 437,445 (2003)).
142. See supra note 52.
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leaving her abuser, far from being irrational, is highly realistic
based just on his threats."143
Some critics believe that the tension between domestic vio-
lence and the states terminating women's parental rights based on
this violence is exacerbated by ASFA. One commentator has
stated that:
[gluided by ASFA, a state could terminate an abused
mother's parental rights because she did not intervene
when her batterer killed or abused her child.... Thus,
the statutory language not only encourages states to as-
sign legal liability to a battered woman for failure to pro-
tect her child, but it also allows states to terminate her
parental rights on these grounds.'4
This is precisely what happened to Mary Ann. While it is dif-
ficult to fault a court for wanting to protect children that have
likely experienced an enormous amount of trauma and uncer-
tainty in their upbringing, the state bears some responsibility for
insuring both a family's stability and the children's protection.
Unfortunately, it was Mary Ann who additionally suffered, per-
haps to a greater extent than she ever deserved. Research sug-
gests that "mother blaming"145 is a deeply ingrained phenomenon
in our society:
Some data suggests that there may be a bias among child
protective services workers monitoring situations of
[child] abuse to believe that the abuse is the mother's
fault. Lawyers in the system may treat the mother's
abuse as a sign of her inability to parent. Finally, courts
are often unsympathetic to an abused mother: even when
143. Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidential-
ity Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 275 (1995).
144. Rachel Venier, Parental Rights and the Best Interests of the Child:
Implications of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 on Domestic Vio-
lence Victims' Rights, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 517, 520-21 (2000).
145. See generally Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflict-
ing Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family and Criminal Law, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 688 (1998); Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding
Liability of Women Who Fail to Protect Their Children From Their Male
Partner's Abuse, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 67 (1995). For a discussion of dif-
ferent feminist schools of thought on legal perceptions and images of "bad
mothers," see Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for
Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (1993).
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she provides evidence of domestic violence, the court may
still declare her an unfit parent due to their fundamental
misunderstanding of domestic violence's impact on a
woman's behavior.146
For Mary Ann's children, it is indeed possible that the best ac-
tion to protect them is the one that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in fact took. However, it is also possible that "the child's
best interests would be better served by removing the abuser from
the family [rather] than removing the child from the home."147 The
court clearly faulted Mary Ann for not leaving Dennis, as well as
the abusive boyfriend who followed Dennis, and took this as a
clear implication of unfitness as a parent. The court also found
that the marriage counseling provided to Mary Ann constituted
"reasonable efforts" to address the domestic violence issue that
pervaded her and her children's lives. The court did not, however,
account for the fact that
[1]eaving... is often a long and arduous struggle and the
difficulty of leaving a batterer is often not appreciated.
Some women's ability to escape their husbands' violence
is used against other women who are not successful in
their attempts. The implication is that the women who
are successful are more caring and conscientious caretak-
ers.
148
The court apparently believed that if Mary Ann just had the
will strong enough to leave her abusers, which the motivation to
protect her children should have provided her, she could do it. The
research, however, suggests otherwise.149
Advocates have suggested that for women in Mary Ann's posi-
tion one possible solution might be more aggressive state inter-
146. Vernier, supra note 145, at 532.
147. Id. at 534.
148. V. Pualani Enos, Recent Development: Prosecuting Battered Mothers:
State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19
HARv. WOMEN's L. J. 229, 245 (1996) (citation omitted). But see generally
Kathryn L. Quaintance, Response to V. Paulani Enos's "Prosecuting Battered
Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Chil-
dren," Published in Volume 19 of the Harvard Women's Law Journal, 21
HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 309 (1998).
149. See Enos, supra note 148, at 255.
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vention to protect the mother, in the form of guardianship. 150 Tra-
ditional empowerment models (such as merely providing victims
with some counseling, as Mary Ann experienced, and hoping they
will take it from there) do not suffice for some women who, "im-
mobilized by violence, need a more aggressive state intervention
than those provided by empowerment-based remedies. Unable to
act on their own, these women require an intervention that per-
mits someone else to act on their behalf." 151 This notion of guardi-
anship has obvious resonance for a woman like Mary Ann, who is
also developmentally disabled. If the state were to enact guide-
lines that require more specifically tailored "reasonable efforts" for
developmentally disabled parents, perhaps more of these issues
would have been addressed in Mary Ann's case.
Terminating Mary Ann's parental rights may indeed save her
children from further abuse by Mary Ann's male partners, but it
does little to alter her own situation into which she may introduce
more children in the future:
Termination of parental rights can sever a battered
woman's relationship with her children, but cannot force
her to sever her relationship with the abuser. While the
children are spared from witnessing abuse, they are re-
moved from a relationship with their mother and may be
left to the vagaries of the foster care system.
152
If the Rhode Island Supreme Court had been better able to
hold the State to a higher burden - perhaps through the use of
enacted guidelines that specifically address developmental disabil-
ity - in proving that true "reasonable efforts" had been provided to
Mary Ann, maybe additional measures would have been taken to
assist her in a more meaningful way.
VI. CONCLUSION
Termination of parental rights cases are never easily decided.
There can be no doubt that the Rhode Island Supreme Court de-
cided Christopher B. with the best interests of Christopher and
Kayla in mind in an attempt to accord these children the nurtur-
150. See Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered
Women: Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 628 (2000).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 640.
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ing environment and permanency that all children need and de-
serve. However, based on its own precedent, the court has stated
that the best interests of the child are not the only interests that
must be accounted for in TPR cases, and that the state has a bur-
den of providing services that meet a "reasonable efforts" standard
before eviscerating the interests of the parents involved. These ef-
forts must be analyzed in a totality of the circumstances frame-
work that acknowledges developmental disabilities and accounts
for enhanced services for parents that have them. If Rhode Island
enacts guidelines that more clearly articulate the burden the state
must meet in providing "reasonable efforts," then courts might
well arrive at a different outcome than that in Mary Ann's case.
Such guidelines would require that the developmental disability of
parents facing terminations of their parental rights be addressed
in all areas of services provided. Unfortunately for Mary Ann, her
rights were terminated prior to the adoption of any such guide-
lines. In the future, more weight ought to be given to the realities
that parents struggling with the myriad of complex issues and
problems like Mary Ann face, and the state must better address
such issues before seeking to terminate the parental rights of de-
velopmentally disabled parents.
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